MONEYBALL VS. TRADITIONAL METHODS
The whole "Moneyball" philosophy covers many different facets of the game. The basic three are:
1) statistics superseding scouting when signing/trading players
2) statistics superseding scouting when drafting players
3) mathematical studies used to influence in-game decisions

I'll try to explain the benefits of the Moneyball (I'm going to stop using the quotes because I'll probably type "Moneyball" five-thousand times in the near future).


Statistics Superseding Scouting When Signing/Trading Players
Personally I think this is when the Moneyball philosophy is the most effective. The idea of on-base and slugging being valuable goes back as far as BRANCH RICKEY and his Brooklyn Dodgers teams of the 1940's and 1950's. People now understand that you want guys to get on base and hit for power. Remarkably this wasn't always that widely known. When the Oakland A's first started going after on-base oriented guys (SCOTT HATTEBERG types) that nobody else wanted, it created a huge advantage for them. Now every team realizes the importance of on-base, so you're not going to find too many .250 AVG/.370 OBP types out there for cheap.

Another advantage to statistical analysis is that it can help predict when a player will break out or when he will decline. It's usually a safe bet when a hitter is young and has high walk totals and low strike out numbers that he possesses a strong command of the strike zone and therefore is inclined to have future success, as opposed to a guy who strikes out three or four times as many times as he walks. Statistics would point to that hitter having many weaknesses that are just waiting to be exploited.

The weakness of relying on statistics is that the players are constantly changing. Maybe a player hit .280/.350/.430 in 2003 but hit only .215/.270/.285 in September of that year. Was the player slumping? Was he finally figured out? Since one month of stats (roughly 100+ at bats) is too small of a sample to really make a judgment on a player, this is where I think scouting is key. A good scout could see a player and say "He's trying to pull everything, he'll be fine" or "this guy can't hit a breaking ball and everybody has figured it out". Again, this might not be 100% accurate, but when dealing with human beings no one system is 100% because people are constantly changing.

Also, the idea that this is so black and white is a false dichotomy. It seems like people have this notion that it's either statistical analysis or scouting and that's it. The fact of the matter is that the gray area is much much larger than the black and white. It's not like scouts completely ignore statistics, just like the Oakland A's or Cleveland Indians or any other Moneyball team don't completely discount scouting.

Statistics Superseding Scouting When Drafting Players
The first part of Moneyball spends a great deal of time covering the 2002 Amateur Draft and how the Oakland A's valued statistics over scouting. I think a lot of this has been blown out of proportion. Guys like JOE BLANTON and NICK SWISHER were going to be first round picks. MARK TEAHEN was going to be drafted early. The other players would have been drafted a few rounds later. You can even say the same about MARK MULDER, JASON GIAMBI and BARRY ZITO. Even JASON GIAMBI was a second-round pick. The Athletics were bad for a long period of time and thus received lots of high draft picks. It takes five or more years to determine whether a team had a good draft or not, and I would say the jury is still out on the 2002 Moneyball draft.

The real big surprise of the 2002 draft was JEREMY BROWN, which the book made a big deal about. Brown has done well in the lower levels of the minors, showing good strike zone command, but Midland, TX is a long way from the big leagues.

If you're looking to draft solid players, I think statistical analysis is a good way to go. If you want to draft studs--franchise type players, I think that you might be better off going by scouting. It's going to be hit or miss, that's the nature of the game. For every JOSH BECKETT out of high school there are five TODD VAN POPPLE type guys, or even worse guys who flame out and never make it to the big leagues. From an economical standpoint it makes more sense to try to draft studs and try to sign utility players or hope that your lower round picks develop into that. It's better to have a young franchise-type player making $300K to about $2.5 mil for six years than to try to go out and sign that type of talent. I think this is what the Milwaukee Brewers have come to realize. Give MARK ROGERS a few million out of high school, if he doesn't pan out oh well. If he does, then you got a front of the rotation starter for cheap for at least two or three years (before arbitration kicks in). Look at BEN SHEETS, he's one of the best starting pitchers in baseball and he's making about $2.5 Mil this year. There's no way the Brewers could go out and sign a Ben Sheets-type player, thats why they have to develop it.

Mathematical Studies to Influence In-Game Decisions
You could include the ideas of on-base and slugging into this because it effects the lineup card and potential pinch hit opportunities, but I'm going to focus more on bunting because it gets a lot of attention in the whole Moneyball debate.

One of the biggest parts of the in-game Moneyball philosophy (and the most often criticized) is the use of the sacrifice bunt. Again, this is not a black and white issue. There is a large gray area here. I know that's not always fun for debates, but it's the reality of the situation.

Runner on second, nobody out. Should the manager call for a bunt?

Some of you might have read that and answered "yes", while some answered "no". My opinion is that you cannot make that decision without knowing the tons of factors that go into it...
What's the score?
What inning is it?
Can the batter bunt for a base hit?
Does the pitcher field his position well?
Where is the infield positioned?
Can the batter move the runner up without bunting?
Who is on deck?

...And there are a myriad of questions that I left out.

There have been studies conducted that said the chances of scoring a run decrease when a sacrifice bunt is laid down. The flaw in these studies is that they never consider when a bunt is beat out for a base hit or when an error is made. With that said, we simply don't know how much a bunt helps or hurts an offense.

Conclusion
The idea of Moneyball was to remove the subjective analysis from baseball and replace it with the objective. There are situations where objective analysis is the right way to make a decision, but a lot of times in baseball you have to be subjective. That's why the same general managers (WALT JOCKETY, BRIAN CASHMAN, JOHN SCHUERHOLZ, Billy Beane, TERRY RYAN) are on top year in and year out. There are teams with financial capital (Baltimore, Los Angeles, Texas, New York Mets) that have had no success or very little until recently (like Los Angeles and Texas). I know black and white are the way we like to see things, but the answer to what is the best way to run a baseball club lies in the shades of gray.